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NEGOTIATING AN ENERGY DEAL UNDER TTIP:
DRIVERS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. SHALE EXPORTS TO
EUROPE
ILARIA ESPA AND KATERYNA HOLZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of global security of energy supply is growing in importance
with the escalation of conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Interruptions of gas
supplies to Ukraine by Russia threaten to cause devastating energy shortages not
only in Ukraine but also in those E.U. Member States, which are dependent on the
gas supplies from Russia via Ukrainian pipelines. In this regard, diversification of
E.U. energy sources may be facilitated by U.S. exports of gas to Europe in view of
breaking the Russian stranglehold on energy supplies.
Yet, this solution currently faces geopolitical, legislative and technical
barriers to energy trade between the European Union and the United States and is
associated with social and environmental costs. The European Union and the
United States need considerable investments into building the necessary
infrastructure for transporting gas from the United States (e.g. liquefied gas
terminals, regasification terminals, requalification of refineries, etc.).' Changes are
also required in the U.S. legislation to allow exports of energy resources (e.g.
elimination of various forms of export quantitative restrictions, such as bans and
non-automatic licensing procedures). Furthermore, an increasing role of the
United States as a major energy exporter faces opposition of the long-established
world energy suppliers in a context of shrinking oil prices, whereas domestically it
confronts different sectors of the U.S. society with contrasting political economy
2interests. Environmental concerns about the impacts of shale oil and gas
exploitation also figure prominently in the debate.
The on-going negotiations of a free trade agreement between the European
Union and the United States-the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
("TTIP") 3-present an opportunity to speed up the dismantling of some of these
barriers. Along with the evident gains for the European Union, the opening of
E.U. energy markets for U.S. shale gas would also benefit the United States, which
. Dr. Ilaria Espa is a Marie Curie (COFIT) Senior Research Fellow and Dr. Kateryna Holzer is a NCCR
Trade Regulation Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the World Trade Institute, University of Bern,
Switzerland. The authors wish to thank the participants to the 2014 ASIL-IEcLIG Biennial Conference
that took place at Denver Sturm College of Law on November 13-15, 2014.
1. Trevor Houser & Shashank Mohan, Kicking Off the Crude Export Debate, RHODIUM GROUP
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://rhg.com/notes/kicking-off-the-crude-export-debate.
2. CHARLES K. EBINGER & GOvINDA AvASARALA, NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT #2:
REVISING THE LNG EXPORT PROCESs 3 (2013).
3. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
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is experiencing shrinkages of shale gas prices caused by oversupplies in the
internal market.4 The mutual interests in energy trade could pave the way for the
materialization of a TTIP chapter on energy and raw materials.5  Furthermore,
given the lack of international rules on energy trade, the negotiations between the
European Union and United States create a unique opportunity to adopt a legal
framework for trade in energy products and raw materials that has never existed
before and could later be plurilateralized.
This paper explores some of the thorniest legal, geopolitical, and economic
issues that need to be taken up by TTIP negotiators for the promotion of a secure
and sustainable trade in energy between the United States and European Union. It
is organized as follows: Section II gives an account of the most recent
developments in the TTIP negotiations on energy; Section III examines the link
between a possible legal framework for energy trade under TTIP and other energy-
related regional and international fora; Section IV critically assesses the
negotiating positions of the European Union and the United States in light of their
reciprocal energy profiles and needs; Section V offers an overview of the critical
items most likely to be on top of the TTIP agenda on energy based on a
comparative analysis of energy provisions in E.U. and U.S. legislation and in light
of the both parties' interests; Section VI discusses the main driving forces and
inhibiting factors capable of facilitating or rather impeding a successful conclusion
of an energy trade deal between the United States and the European Union; and
Section VII provides concluding remarks.
II. TTIP NEGOTIATIONS ON ENERGY
In June 2013, the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union
provided the European Commission with a mandate for negotiating TTIP with the
United States.6 Since then, TTIP negotiations have been carried out in regular
rounds focusing on the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to transatlantic
trade and facilitation of mutual investments. The negotiations are closed to the
public. Yet, the parties, especially the European Union, make their positions on
major subjects of negotiations known in press releases, statements of government
7 8
officials,7 and initial position papers. Moreover, at the beginning of January 2015,
4. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1.
5. Press Release, Karel De Gucht, European Comm'r for Trade, The Future of TTIP-The
Benefits and How to Achieve Them (Apr. 10, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-14-
314_en.htm._See also Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, EU-US Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (July 2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc 151624.pdf.
6. See Memo, European Comm'n, Member States endorse EU-US trade and investment
negotiations, MEMO/13/564 (June 14, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-
564_en.htm.
7 See Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, European Trade Comm'n, Speech at
The Aspen Institute Prague Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP)--Solving the Regulatory Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc 151822.pdf.
8. See EU publishes initial 777P Position Papers, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Jul. 16, 2013),
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the European Commission published a bulk of E.U. textual proposals, which
include the legal language and binding rules the European Union is pushing for
during TTIP negotiations, but exclude sensitive documents regarding market
access, quotas and tariffs, as well as proposals on regulatory coherence and
sustainable development, which first need to be agreed with the E.U. Council and
Parliament. 9 From the available documents, it is clear that energy is an important
part of TTIP negotiations.' 0 The European Union seeks to include in the TTIP a
separate chapter on trade and investment in raw materials and energy, including
coal, oil and oil products, gas, and electricity. This proposal features prominently
in a non-paper on raw materials and energy drafted by the European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade on September 20, 2013. I1
Referring to the lack of international disciplines on trade in energy and raw
materials, the European Union supports the inclusion of legally binding
commitments regarding these issues in TTIP.12 In particular, seeking to promote
fair competition in the energy sector, the European Union proposes rules
prohibiting trading and export monopolies, preventing dual pricing, and facilitating
transit and access to energy transport facilities.13 It also proposes to ban local
content requirements in support schemes for renewable energy.14 TTIP rules on
energy would also guarantee access and national treatment to enterprises of one
party established on the territory of the other party in matters of prospecting,
exploring, production, purchase, sale, import, and export of raw materials and
energy.15 A general exception is foreseen for measures necessary for the safe
operation of the energy networks, subject to the requirement that such measures
are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination.' 6  The E.U. position is that such an open, stable,
predictable, sustainable, transparent, and non-discriminatory legal framework for
traders and investors in raw materials and energy, agreed in the transatlantic
context, could serve as a model for subsequent negotiations involving third
countries.' 7 The European Union has also declared that energy efficiency and the
promotion of renewable energy are fundamental aspects of the energy policy of the
European Union and the United States, both having a shared interest in improving
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=943.
9. See Now online EU negotiating texts in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=l 230.
10. See Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5.
11. The E.U. non-paper on the TTIP chapter on energy and raw materials was leaked and
published by the Huffington Post on May 19, 2014. TTIP-Non Papers on Raw Materials and Energy
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/TTIPNonPaper.pdf.
12. See Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5, at 1-2.
13. Zach Carter & Kate Sheppard, Read The Secret Trade Memo Calling For More Fracking And





17 Initial EU Position Paper on Raw Materials and Energy, supra note 5, at 2.
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global governance in the area of renewable energy. 18 The TTIP should therefore
support the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency and guarantee
the right of each party to maintain or establish standards and regulation concerning
energy performance of products, appliances and processes, while working towards
a convergence of domestic standards or the use of international standards where
these exist.
19
While striving to fix fair competition rules in bilateral energy trade with the
possibility for their further multilateralization in the future, the European Union is
also pushing for the abolition of U.S. export restrictions on energy goods,
including crude oil and gas, in order to increase U.S. imports of energy into the
European Union.20 Exports of energy goods to the other party would be made
automatically compliant with any conditions and tests foreseen in the parties'
respective legislation for the granting of export licences. 21 Through liberalization
of the U.S. export regime for energy, the European Union seeks to increase
diversification of its energy imports and improve energy security, currently
undermined by the threats of discontinuation of gas supplies from Russia in the
midst of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is this part of the U.S.-E.U. energy
negotiations that will be addressed in the following sections.
III. DEALING WITH ENERGY TRADE UNDER FTAs
While a recent generation of Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") covers a broad
area of issues, often additional to what is covered by the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement (e.g. competition, government procurement obligations for
developing countries etc.), energy issues are usually not separately addressed in
FTAs. This may have different explanations. On the one hand, there is a
perception that as part of national security interests, the regulation of the energy
sector is traditionally in the hands of sovereign national governments, and
international trading rules have nothing to say on how energy should be traded.
On the other hand, it is argued that energy is just another good or economic sector,
and thus it falls within the scope of the WTO Agreement and is subject to the
general rules of international trade (market access, most-favoured nation treatment,
national treatment etc.) like all other goods or economic sectors.22 Accordingly,
energy trade is regulated by general FTA provisions applicable to trade in goods
23and services. At the same time, the proponents of the latter view usually also
agree that the international trading rules of the WTO are poorly designed to meet
18. Id. at 3.
19 Id.
20. Carter & Sheppard, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act: Hearing on H.R. 6 Before Subcomm. on
Energy & Power of the Energy & Commerce Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of James Bacchus,
Chair, Greenberg Traurig), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20140325/101953/HHRG-113-
IF03-Wstate-BacchusJ-20140325.pdf [hereinafter Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act].
23. For example, provisions on national treatment, elimination of customs duties, prohibition of
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports etc.
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the current needs of the energy sector.24 The reason for this is partly the difference
between the regulatory needs of trade in energy and those of other goods and
services. While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO
rules traditionally put the emphasis on market access (i.e. liberalisation of import
regimes), the needs of the energy sector are more on the side of supply pushing for
the liberalisation of export regimes.
2 5
A. Energy under E. U.-Signed FTAs and Sectorial Agreements
The access to energy supplies has always been an important issue for the
European Union. It is not merely coincidence that the European Union takes its
origin from an energy agreement-the European Coal and Steel Community
established by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg
in 1951. The initial idea behind the European integration was to create a common
European market for coal and steel and thus neutralize competition between West
European countries over natural resources and thus prevent wars in the future.
26
The West European steel and coal industries were gradually united through
common industrial, social and tax policies, and anti-cartel legislation.
Later, faced with the geopolitical changes in the early 1990s, the European
Union initiated the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT"), a pan-European energy
agreement, which was initially aimed to integrate the former Soviet energy sector
and its highly developed pipeline system with the European energy market on the
principles of free market economy. 27 The ECT extended the GATT rules to trade
in energy with Russia, which at that time was outside the WTO. The treaty covers
all energy goods, including fossil fuels, petroleum and electricity, and energy-
related equipment, but it does not cover energy-related services. Despite the fact
that the ECT promotes open markets and market rules in the energy sector, it
recognizes the principle of national sovereignty over energy resources. 28  It
therefore leaves for governments to choose how to define the structure of national
energy sectors, how to develop national energy resources and whether to open the
energy sector to foreign investors or not.29 For instance, the ECT does not impose
an obligation to privatize state-owned energy companies or to break down
24. The WTO Agreement does not contain rules that are specific to energy. See Thomas Cottier
et al., Energy in WTO Law and Policy, in THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION
211-244 (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2010).
25. Melaku Desta, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the World Trade
Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 523, 539 (2003).
26. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, DIE RECHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION
41-42 (2010).
27. The geographical scope of the treaty was later extended to include such non-European
countries as Australia, Japan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See Members &
Observers, ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
28. The Energy Charter Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95,
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/userupload/document/EN.pdf.
29. Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and the International Energy Governance, in
REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 376,
392 (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011).
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vertically integrated energy companies.
Regarding the regulation of energy trade in E.U. FTAs and its broader
Economic Partnership Agreements ("EPAs"), so far there have been no provisions
that would specifically apply to energy. This basically means that all energy
matters under E.U. FTAs fall under the general provisions on trade in goods, trade
in services, and investment under those agreements.
B. Energy under U.S. FTAs
As of December 2014, the United States had FTAs in force with twenty
countries, but an FTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico-the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")-is unique in the way it deals with
energy.31  NAFTA contains provisions that separately regulate trade and
investment in energy and trade in energy-related cross-border services. These
provisions are not only spread over different chapters in the agreement, but also
separately dealt with in Chapter 6 on "Energy and Basic Petrochemicals." 32 All
energy-related matters under NAFTA are subject to the general mandatory dispute
settlement procedure, including investor-state arbitration.33 However, similar to
the Energy Charter Treaty, which underlines state sovereignty over energy
resources, NAFTA Article 601 confirms full respect for the Constitutions of the
parties, which automatically sets limits to the regulatory leverage of the FTA with
respect to energy.
34
The disciplines contained in the NAFTA energy chapter apply to a wide range
of energy products, including diesel, gasoline, and electricity. They exclude,
however, biofuels and energy-related equipment, which are subject to general rules
35
on trade and investment under NAFTA. Many NAFTA provisions on energy are
WTO-plus, which means that they impose additional obligations to those imposed
by the WTO Agreement on WTO members.36 They include, for instance, along
with the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, the restriction on the use of export
30. It is also important to mention that a recently concluded FTA between the European Union
and Canada-the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ("CETA"), which is considered by
many to serve as a template for TTIP-has no separate chapter on energy either. However, it foresees
an investor-state arbitration, which may influence investments in the energy sector.
31. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). It should be noted that the legal
framework for energy trade and investment was first developed in CUSFTA, a 1989 FTA between the
United States and Canada that was then replaced by NAFTA. CUSFTA provisions on energy were
contained in chapter 9 in part II on trade in goods.
32. North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 6, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993),
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement.
33. See id. ch. I,§B.
34. See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 28; see also North American Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 601.
35. GARY HORLICK ET AL., NAFTA PROVISIONS AND TtE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 29 (June 2002)
(background paper prepared for the Commission for Environmental Cooperation Secretariat),
http://www3.cec.org/islandora/en/item/1821 -nafta-provisions-and-electricity-sector-en.pdf.
36. Id. at 18.
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duties and the prohibition of minimum or maximum energy export- or import-price
requirements (the so-called dual pricing practice) that benefit domestic consumers
and economies.37 They also impose stricter conditions for the use of exceptions.38
In general terms, the use of exceptions cannot result in a complete interruption of
energy exports from one NAFTA party to another NAFTA party, be it for the
reasons of critical shortages, environmental protection or any other justification
foreseen under GATT Article XX.
39
In practice, however, only the United States and Canada are bound by
NAFTA special commitments on energy trade and investment. Having the
government monopoly in the energy sector, Mexico managed to pull itself out of
most of the obligations related to energy, which made energy rules of NAFTA
Chapter 6 a bilateral deal between the United States and Canada.40 One can also
point to other weaknesses of NAFTA rules on energy. Article 601 speaks only
about "gradual liberalisation" of trade in energy, thus showing certain tolerance for
non-market mechanisms with respect to energy trade and investment in contrast to
other sectors. 41  NAFTA also fails to address issues of access to energy
infrastructure. It does not provide any rules on transit fees and third party access
that would be additional to the basic ones, which are contained in the GATT for all
goods.42
As mentioned, NAFTA is the most advanced FTA regarding the regulation of
energy trade and investment. An energy agreement between the European Union
and the United States could draw on NAFTA Chapter 6 on "Energy and Basic
Petrochemicals" in many respects. At the same time, it should be noted that under
U.S. domestic legislation, all U.S. FTA partners enjoy a more liberal regime for the
exportation of natural gas from the U.S. Exports of liquefied natural gas ("LNG")
to FTA partners are presumptively considered in the "public interest" and thus are
entitled to licenses. 43 Accordingly, independently from the outcome of the E.U.-
U.S. specific negotiations on energy, the conclusion of TTIP itself would facilitate
the exports of LNG from the United States to the European Union.
VI. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. The European Union as a Demandeur
The European Union is the third greatest world energy consumer after China
and the United States, and accounted for 13.8 percent of global final energy
37. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 604, 603.2.
38. See id. art. 605.
39. Roberto R. Herran & Pietro Poretti, Energy Trade and Investment under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 363 (Yulia
Selivanova ed., 2011).
40. Id. at 358-64.
41. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 32, art. 601.
42. Id. at 336.
43. Among major natural gas importers, the only country which has not concluded an FTA with
the United States is South Korea. See Ebinger & Avasarala, supra note 2, at 4. See infra Section V.
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consumption in 201 0.44  Although primary energy production is substantially
declining in the European Union due to supplies depletion and the effects of
climate change policies discouraging the exploitation of fossil fuels, 45 the
European Union still relies on conventional energy resources to meet around three-
quarters of its total energy consumption. According to 2010 figures, oil is the
largest energy source providing 35 percent of total energy consumption, followed
by natural gas (24 percent) and coal (16 percent).46 Nuclear power accounts for 14
percent of global energy consumption, and the share of renewable energy is 10
percent (6.8 percent comes from biomass and renewable wastes, 1.6 percent from
hydropower, 0.9 percent from wind energy, 0.4 percent from geothermal, and 0.4
percent from solar energy).47
This state of things translates into a heavy, and growing, dependence on the
importation of primary energy supplies. The European Union imported almost 85
percent of its oil consumption, 67 percent of its gas consumption and more than 40
percent of its coal consumption in 201 1.4 8 Russia is by far its largest source of
fossil fuels, providing 35 percent of total oil imports, 30 percent of overall natural
gas imports, and 26 percent of global coal imports in 2011.49
The substantial dependence of the European Union upon the availability of
Russian oil and gas supplies has become a major area of concern in light of the
conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The issue of diversification
of import sources has accordingly gained prominence in the E.U. political
agenda. 50 The European Union in particular has started to explore opportunities to
44. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK 13 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_pocketbook.pdf.
45. EUROSTAT, THE EU IN THE WORLD 2013: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 117 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/321 7494/5748537/KS-30-12-86 1-EN.PDF/d60278b9-dOee-
47cl-bb96-2dbb9a5b80cb?version=l.0. GHG emissions abatement has figured prominently in the
European energy agenda. The European Union adopted its first package of climate and energy
measures in 2008. This set of measures established the so-called "20/20/20 targets" (i.e. the
achievement of a 20% reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 compared to the levels of 1990, a 20%
share of renewable energy, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency). The 2020 Climate and
Energy Package, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index-en.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015). While the European Union is projected to fulfil and even surpass the 20/20/20
goals, a new set of E.U. targets was proposed within the context of a renovated European policy
framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from
2020 to 2030, at 2, COM (2014) 15 final (Feb. 22, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN.
46. EUROPEAN COMM'N, MARKET OBSERVATORY FOR ENERGY, KEY FIGURES 11 (2011),
https://feb.kuleuven.be/public/nO7048/EU%20Energy.pdf.
47. See EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2013, supra note 44, at 20. In 2012, the
share of renewable energy reached 13 percent. A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the
Periodfrom 2020 to 2030, supra note 45, at 2.
48. EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK, supra note 44, at 22.
49. Id. at 24.
50. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
European Energy Security Strategy, COM (2014) 0330 final (May 28, 2014).
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facilitate the conclusion of supply contracts with alternative reliable suppliers.
Significantly, the United States has been identified as a potential strategic partner
in this respect. 51 The on-going TTIP negotiations are therefore critical for the
European Union in view of securing privileged commercial relations in the energy
sector with the United States and therefore achieving the diversification of the
energy supply.
B. The U.S. Interests and the Case for Changes in its Current Energy Exports
Regime
The United States is a relatively richly-endowed country with a long history
of self-sufficiency in the energy sector. However, as from the second half of the
twentieth century, the country started to increasingly rely on the importation of
energy resources from the Middle East.52  The Arab oil embargo of 1973
confronted the United States with the vulnerability linked to import dependency
and marked the beginning of a decisive turn in the energy policy of the country.
53
Since then, the U.S. has consistently looked for ways to relieve its dependence on
foreign energy supplies.54 Accordingly, it radically reformed the export regime
applicable to primary energy supplies.
55
It should be noted that the U.S. was the top world energy consumer until the
end of the 2000s and thereafter the second global energy consumer after China,
56
remaining for a long time a major net importer of energy supplies. Still in 2006,
the U.S. was by far the biggest net importer of crude oil in the world, with over
13.4 million barrels imported per day.57 The shale revolution has, however,
sensibly changed the picture. As of September 2013, the U.S. is no longer the
leading net oil importer, as it has been surpassed by China.58 At the same time, the
U.S. has recently become the top world producer of crude oil, ahead of Saudi
Arabia and the Russian Federation.5 9  According to the Brookings Institute,
"[s]hale oil will also emerge as a route to self-sufficiency for the U.S., as the shale
51. Id. at 15.
52. MARIAN RADETZKI, A HANDBOOK OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
43-44 (2008).
53. Tim Boersma & Charles K. Ebinger, Lift the Ban on U.S. Oil Exports, Memorandum to
President Barack Obama, BROOKINGS (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/lift-ban-us-oil-exports-boersma-ebinger.
54. Konrad Yakabuski, The Downsides of U.S. Energy Independence, GLOBE & MAIL (May 13,
2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-downsides-of-us-energy-
independence/article 11869851.
55. Boersma & Ebinger, supra note 53.
56. EU ENERGY IN FIGURES: STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK, supra note 44 at 13.
57. EDWARD L. MORSE ET AL., ENERGY 2020: OUT OF AMERICA: THE RAPID RISE OF THE UNITED
STATES AS A GLOBAL ENERGY SUPERPOWER (2014),
http://www.investorvillage.coml/uploads/44821/files/CitiUSenergyPowerhouse2020.pdf.
58. Candace Dunn, Today in Energy: China is Now the World's Largest Net Importer of
Petroleum and Other Liquid Fuels, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfn?id=1553 1.
59. Countries with Highest Primary Energy Production, SHIFT PROJECT DATA PORTAL,
http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/TOP-20-Producer#tspQvChart (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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oil revolution taking place in the United States could result in the tripling of shale
oil output to five million barrels a day by 2017."60 Moreover, projections also
indicate that the shale gas revolution will transform the U.S., currently the largest
world consumer of natural gas, into a major gas exporter.6'
The shale revolution notwithstanding, the United States still has in place a
comprehensive export regime that dates back to the 1970s, the time of the reaction
to the Arab oil embargo. With respect to crude oil exports in particular, a number
of new acts were concluded in these years: the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act (1973),62 which substantially amended the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920;63 the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (1975);64 and the Naval
65Petroleum Reserves Production Act (1976). Since then, a complex regime
applicable to crude oil exports from the United States to a foreign country has been
developed and administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS"), an
agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The cardinal points of such regime
are contained in Part 754 of the BIS Export Administration Regulations ("EAR")
on Short Supply Controls. 66 Under the BIS regulations, depending on the place of
origin or the mode of transport of crude oil, its exportation is allowed only insofar
as it is granted (1) explicit presidential authorization or (2) a BIS license.
Presidential authorization is needed for the exportation of domestically
produced crude oil under specific statutory control regimes. These include: (1)
exports of Alaskan North Slope oil under §203 of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, as found in §28 of the Mineral Leasing Act;67 (2) exports of
domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted
pursuant to §28(u) of the Mineral Leasing Act;68 (3) export of crude oil produced
from the outer Continental Shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act;
69
and (4) exports of crude oil produced from the naval petroleum reserves under the
Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act.7° Under such statutory controls,
exports may only be approved if the president makes and publishes an explicit
finding that such exports will not diminish the total quantity or quality of
petroleum available to the United States, are in the national interest and in
accordance with the Export Administration Act of 1979.71 The president must
60. SUBIR GOKARN ET AL., ENERGY 2030: BACKGROUNDER 17 (2013), http://brookings.in/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Energy-2030-Brookings-India-Backgrounder.pdf.
61. Id.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (2014).
63. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2014).
64. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 62-64 (2014).
65. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-258, 90 Stat. 26 (codified as
amended in sections of 42 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 43 C.F.R.).
66. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2 (2015).
67. 30 U.S.C. § 185(s) (2014).
68. Id. § 185(u) (2014).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1354 (2014).
70. 10 U.S.C. § 7430 (2014).
71. Depending on the applicable law, the presidential findings must also fulfil other specific
criteria. In the case of exports of Alaskan North Slope oil, for instance, the evaluation of whether
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submit to the Congress a report containing such findings and explaining the
reasons for justifying crude oil exports. 72 The Congress has sixty days to veto the
presidential permission.73 Finally, under the Export Administration Act, the
president has also the authority to restrict refined petroleum products exports.7 4
This authority has however not been exercised since 1981.75
The BIS automatically approves exports that are consistent with findings
made by the president under specific applicable statutes.76 Different kinds of crude
oil export transaction are moreover generally approved by the BIS: (i) exports from
Alaska's Cook Inlet; 77 (ii) exports to Canada for consumption or use therein; 78 (iii)
exports in connection with refining or exchange of strategic petroleum reserve
oil;79 (iv) exports of heavy California crude oil;80 (v) exports that are consistent
with certain international agreements; 81 (vi) export that are consistent with findings
made by the president under an applicable statute;82 (vii) exports of foreign origin
crude oil, provided that the oil has not been commingled with oil of U.S. origin. 83
All other applications are reviewed by the BIS on a case-by-case basis and only
approved if BIS determines that they are consistent with the national interest and
the purposes of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
84
A very stringent export-licensing regime is also imposed in the United States
on natural gas. Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as subsequently amended, 85
the Department of Energy ("DoE") is responsible for administering natural gas
exports licences. 86 As already mentioned, a different regime applies depending on
whether the natural gas is exported to FTA partners or to non-FTA countries.
Applications to export natural gas to FTA partners are presumptively considered in
the "public interest." 87 Natural gas exports to non-FTA countries are approved by
exports are in the national interest needs to also take into account the results of an appropriate
environmental review and "whether exports of this oil are likely to cause sustained material oil supply
shortages or sustained oil prices significantly above world market levels that would cause sustained
material adverse employment effects in the United States or that would cause substantial harm to
consumers, including non-contiguous States and Pacific territories." 30 U.S.C. § 185(s) (2014).
72. See 30 U.S.C. § 185(u), 43 U.S.C. § 1354(c), and 10 U.S.C. § 7430(e). This requirement does
not apply, however, in the case of exports of Alaskan North Slope oil. 30 U.S.C. § 185(s).
73. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 185(u) and 43 U.S.C. § 1354(c).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 2406(e) (2014).
75. John Kemp, History of Controls on U.S. Oil Exports, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/usa-oil-export-controlsno-kemp-idUSL6NOS137X20141023.
76. 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b).
77. Id. § 754.2(b)(i).
78. Id. § 754.2(b)(ii).
79. Id. § 754.2(b)(iii).
80. Id. § 754.2(b)(iv).
81. Id. § 754.2(b)(v).
82. Id. § 754.2(b)(vi).
83. Id. § 754.2(vii).
84. Id. § 754.2(2).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2014).
86. Id.
87. Among major LNG importers, the only country which has not concluded a FTA with the
United States is South Korea. Ebinger & Avarsarala, supra note 2, at 4.
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the DoE only insofar as they are in the "public interest." The guiding criteria to
determine whether the natural gas exports are in the public interest or not have not
been laid out in any relevant instrument. The 1984 DoE Guidelines affirm that
market considerations should govern the evaluation; 88 however, the DoE has
declared that the applications are prioritized in the order that they were received
and having due regard to their "cumulative impact" on the gas market and prices.
8 9
Other criteria the DOE listed are "domestic need, adequacy of supply, the
environment, geopolitics, and energy security." 90 Another relevant factor taken
into consideration is whether the prospective exporter has already completed the
pre-filing process before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
which is responsible for the siting and construction of LNG import and export
facilities. 91
Since the shale gas revolution in the mid-2000s, the DoE has approved only
two applications of LNG exports directed to non-FTA countries: the Cheniere
Energy Sabine Pass terminal in 2012 and the Freeport LNG terminal in 2013.92
Currently, there are fifteen projects awaiting approval, which represent over 40
percent of U.S. daily consumption of natural gas.93 The lack of clarity surrounding
the timing of approval determinations has ignited the debate over whether more
expedited licensing procedure should be ensured to LNG export applicants. To
this end, the Export American Natural Gas Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate
on December 12, 2013.94 It provides for a two-month limit for the DoE to approve
LNG export applications. 95 On October 7, 2014, the North Atlantic Energy
Security Act was also introduced in the U.S. Senate with the aim to automatically
grant a license to LNG exports directed to Ukraine, NATO allies, and Japan.
96
The existing U.S. legislation applicable to crude oil and natural gas exports
represents a major obstacle in view of realizing a full liberalization of energy
resources trade between the United States and the European Union. Furthermore,
it presents many incompatibility problems with WTO law and, in particular, GATT
provisions. Export bans, such as those applied on U.S. crude oil, are outlawed by
88. Id. (citing Freeport LNH Expansion, L.P., et al, Order Conditionally Granting Long-Term
Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Freeport LNG
Terminal on Quintana Island, Texas to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations, DOE/FE Docket No. 3282,
Docket No. 10-161 -LNG, 6, 112 (May 17 2013),
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/Orders-Issued-201 3/ord3282.pdf.)
89. Id.
90. See MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 13 (2013).
91. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N: LNG,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/Ing.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
92. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N: NORTH AMERICAN LNG IMPORT/EXPORT
TERMINALS APPROVED, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-approved.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015).
93. Ebinger & Avarsarala, supra note 2 at 4.
94. H.R. 3760, 113th Cong. (2013).
95. See id.
96. See S. 2592, 113th Cong. § 108 (2013).
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Article XI: 1 GATT.97 The same is true for non-automatic export licensing regimes
which create uncertainties or affect investment plans by delaying the
determinations as to whether a license is to be granted or not, as it is the case in the
U.S. natural gas export licensing regime.98 Moreover, this system differentiates the
treatment of like natural gas exports depending on whether they are directed to
FTA and non-FTA partners thus running counter to the most-favored nation
("MFN") principle under Article 1:1 GATT. 99 The general exceptions recognized
under Article XX GATT, finally, seem only partially of use, as the determinations
of the 'national/public interest' by the BIS and the DoE do not respond to relevant
public policy goals, such as, for example, the protection of public health or the
conservation of natural resources, but rather take into account the impact of
increased exports on the domestic oil/gas markets and prices.
0
VI. TOWARDS AN E.U.-U.S. ENERGY SUPPLIES DEAL
In light of all the foregoing, the existing U.S. legislation restricting the
exportation of crude oil and natural gas will likely be targeted by the European
Union during the TTIP negotiations process. In its FTAs, the European Union has
in fact traditionally concluded rules on export restrictions that contain at least the
same prohibitions as those of the GATT. Very often, the European Union has
aimed for the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations on export restrictions in its FTAs,
mostly in the form of limited recourse to GATT exceptions available for Article
XI: I GATT-inconsistent measures. It has also negotiated WTO-plus obligations in
the form of a general prohibition of export duties-admitted under Article XI: 1
GATT-with several FTA partners.' 0' Yet, in this respect it has frequently
allowed for some forms of flexibility, either in the form of a progressive phasing
out (as accepted by the European Union with countries such as Chile, Colombia
and Peru, and South Korea for targeted products) or in the form of a product-
specific exception (e.g. the agricultural products exception negotiated by the
European Union with neighboring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Croatia and
Macedonia). However, this avenue would be pre-empted in the TTIP negotiations
because the U.S. Constitution's Export Clause bars Congress from imposing export
taxes in all circumstances.'
0 2
The practice of the European Union concerning the rules on export
restrictions contained in its FTAs indicates that the European Union is likely to
advocate a complete removal of export barriers in the E.U./U.S. bilateral trade
relations along the lines of its fully liberalized export regime on energy
97. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
98. Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act, supra note 22 at 4.
99. GATT, supra note 97 at art. I(1).
100. Id.
101. See J. Korinek & J. Bartos, Multilateralising Regionalism: Disciplines on Export Restrictions
in Regional Trade Agreements, (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Trade Policy Papers No. 139,
17, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k962hf7hfnr-en.
102. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9; See E. M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6-75 (2003).
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resources. 10 3  It is, however, uncertain whether these E.U. initiatives will be
supported by the United States. In a non-paper'0 4 on energy and raw materials,
circulated by the European Union on May 27, 2014, it is noted that the United
States has so far been hesitant to discuss a solution for U.S. export restrictions on
crude oil and natural gas in the TTIP through binding legal commitments. 0 5 As
will be discussed below, such reluctance by the United States can primarily be
explained by its concerns that the increased energy exports would drive the
domestic energy prices up, thereby putting its oil refineries, petrochemical and
other energy-dependant industries and consumers at a competitive disadvantage.
The document further reports that the United States has shown only limited
openness towards considering energy-specific provisions on transport and transit
as well as cooperation provisions on off-shore safety, and that a clear agreement to
discuss a comprehensive chapter on energy and raw materials is still lacking.
It should also be noted that the negotiations of energy-specific rules on export
restrictions is a major element of novelty for the European Union, whereas the
United States already has the NAFTA model as a precedent. While the
liberalisation of the U.S. energy export regime could immediately serve the energy
security interests of the European Union, its consequences in the United States are
much more mixed. As we shall see below, different categories of producers and
consumers are going to be affected by the economic effects of a lift of export
barriers on crude oil and natural gas. These various conflicting interests may serve
at times as driving forces or inhibiting factors in the conclusion of a deal between
the United States and the European Union on the treatment of energy export
restrictions. External factors such as oil prices may further influence the outcome.
VII. DRIVING FORCES AND INHIBITING FACTORS FOR AN E.U.-U.S. ENERGY
SUPPLIES DEAL
A. Geopolitical Situation and Global Oil Prices
The prospects of an energy trade agreement between the United States and the
European Union are likely to be influenced by geopolitical developments. The
current geopolitical tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine over the
Ukrainian course toward the European integration poses the risk of energy
blockade for the large territory of Eastern and Central Europe. When disagreeing
on gas prices with Ukraine, Russia stopped supplies of gas through the Ukrainian
103. Council Regulation 1061/2009, Establishing Common Rules for Exports, 19 Oct. 2009 O.J.
(L 291/1) repealed, among others, Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2603/69, as amended by
Regulation (EEC) No. 1934/82 of 12 July 1982, and Regulation (EEC) No. 3918/91 of 19 December
1991. Under this Article, E.U. Member States could maintain under certain conditions export
restrictions on petroleum oil products, oils obtained from bituminous material and other varieties of oil.
104. Non-papers are documents prepared by E.U. institutions with the aim to stimulate discussion
on a particular sensitive issue to be decided in the future. Non-papers have no official status.
105. Simon McKeagney, LEAKED: Proposal Reveals EU Pressure on US to Lift Ban on Crude
Oil Exports-TTIP, GREENS EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE (July 9, 2014), http://www.ttip20l4.eu/blog-
detail/blog/WP%201eak%20TTIP%20energy.html.
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pipelines in the winter of 2008-2009.106 This stoppage affected not only Ukraine,
but also Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Romania and other Central
European countries. 107 Taking into account the special needs of these countries for
heating in winter, as well as the energy needs of their industries, the current
situation presents a serious threat for the national security of Europe and pushes
the European Union to diversify its energy supplies, particularly through supplies
of LNG from the United States.
At the same time, energy supplies have long been a key determinant of the
world politics.'0 8 The history of the Soviet Union presents a remarkable account of
how energy resources influence the international position of a country. The
economic growth and political power of the Soviet Union was based on its energy
resources. The Soviet Union developed into a superpower in the 1960-1970s,
when the world prices for oil were high; accordingly, the collapse of the Soviet
economy and eventual breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 was accompanied
by the drastic decrease in oil prices in the 1980s.'0 9 While the reason for the recent
drop in oil prices from US$115 in June 2014 to US$50 in January 2015 is not
entirely clear, the current geopolitical situation is most likely part of it." 0 Low oil
prices could serve as a non-military tool to deter Russia from violating
international law, inasmuch as the Russian economy heavily depends on oil and
gas as the main sources of state revenues. In 2013, for instance, Russia needed an
average of US$117 per barrel to balance its state budget, which has been
considerably increased in the last years to finance social programs, the army and
salaries for state employees."'
The dumping of oil prices might also be part of a strategy of leading energy
exporters aimed at making the U.S. exports of LNG to the European Union and
other countries economically unfeasible.' 12 OPEC countries are not willing to lose
their high shares in the E.U. and Asian energy markets to the U.S. shale oil and gas
106. Robert Lea, Europe plunged into energy crisis as Russia cuts off gas supply via Ukraine,
DAILY MAIL (last updated Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1106382/Europe-
plunged-energy-crisis-Russia-cuts-gas-supply-Ukraine.html.
107. Id.
108. See BRUCE JONES ET AL., FUELING A NEW ORDER? THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL AND SECURITY
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY 11 (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/iles/papers/2014/04/14%2 0geopolitica%
2 0security% 2 0co
nsequences%20energy%20jones/14%20geopolitical%20security% 2 0energy%2 0jones% 2 0stevenfixed.
pdf.
109. See Gail Tverberg, Oil Prices and the Fall of the Soviet Union, OILPRICE.COM (Aug.11,
2011), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Prices-And-The-Fall-Of-The-Soviet-Union.htm.
110. Anjli Raval & Neil Hume, Oil Markets: A New Chapter for OPEC, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov.
24, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64c2485e-70a4-11e4-8113-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. It should
be noted, however, that the OPEC leaders persistently deny the geopolitical component of the sharp
drop of oil prices stating that they "do not seek to politicize oil... it's purely business" and that oil
prices fall because supply of oil exceeds demand.
11l. Craig Mellow, Drop in Crude Oil Prices Could Pressure Russia's Budget, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3385857/banking-and-capital-
markets-banking/drop-in-crude-oil-prices-could-pressure-russias-budget.html.
112. Raval & Hume, supra note 110 at 7.
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over the next decade.'1 3 They are also interested in winning back their U.S. market
shares, where the profitability of drilling is undermined with prices below US$80
per barrel." 
4
Irrespective of the reason behind the plunge of oil prices, the current level of
prices and the refusal of OPEC countries to cut the production to bring the prices
up may influence the outcome of E.U.-U.S. negotiations on U.S. energy exports to
the European Union. How big the impact will be depends on how low the oil
prices fall. Experts argue that the U.S. shale oil production growth is robust in the
face of low oil prices and that U.S. rigs will only stop drilling if prices fall below a
level of US$30 per barrel and only after some time. 115 Moreover, a recent study
shows that lower oil prices may speed up the decision of the U.S. government to
lift its crude oil export ban, as "there will be increasing pressures, and an increased
national interest, in allowing exports of larger volumes of condensate and even of
light tight oil" for which the refinery facilities in the United States are limited,
while importing heavy crude oil at lower prices. 16
In conclusion, the geopolitical situation is currently conducive to launching
supplies of U.S. LNG to Europe, while the impact of falling oil prices is not
straightforward and will depend on the persistence of low prices and the ability of
markets to adjust.
B. Infrastructural Problems
Due to the peculiarities of sectorial energy infrastructure, the removal of
existing U.S. export barriers on crude oil and natural gas could either be beneficial
for both the European Union and the United States or rather constitute an obstacle
to the conclusion of an energy deal between the U.S. and the E.U.
With respect to crude oil, the case for lifting the U.S. ban lies in the current
location and configuration of U.S. refineries. Prior to the shale oil boom, U.S. oil
companies invested massively in world-class refineries located in the Gulf of
Mexico (so-called PADD III) that can process heavy, higher sulphur (i.e. sour)
crude coming from the Middle East and Venezuela. 17 Since the U.S. shale oil
revolution in 2008, however, the shale formations in North Dakota, Texas, New
Mexico, and other midcontinent formations are producing lighter and low-sulfur
(i.e. sweet) crude. 18 The existing U.S. refining capacity configured to process
113. ENERGY 2020, supra note 57, at 31, 52.
114. Andrew Critchlow, US Oil Production Surge to Break Saudi Arabia's Grip on World Energy,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/1 1215412/US-oil-production-surge-
to-break-Saudi-Arabias-grip-on-world-energy.html.
115. Patti Domm, OPEC Won't Stop US Oil Production Growth, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2014, 6:31 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102234051 (Fadel Gheit, senior energy analyst at Oppenheimer discusses U.S.
shale production).
116. ENERGY 2020, supra note 57 at 86.
117. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. PADD III refineries account for half of the total refining
capacity of the United States.
118. Id.
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sour crudes can only partially process sweet crudes. As a result, local oversupply
situations have arisen and light crudes have been under-priced compared to
internationally-traded heavier crudes. 119  Because of this mismatch between
domestic prices and global light oil prices, the U.S. oil industry would gain from
exporting light crudes to refineries located elsewhere, while still importing heavy
crudes and thus capitalizing the investments made in the Gulf of Mexico. This is
even more so considering the nosedive turn of global oil prices at which U.S. oil
refineries could import heavy crudes.
120
In the case of natural gas, the terms of the debate are more mixed. On the one
hand, the surge in natural gas production imposes a redesigning of existing U.S.
natural gas infrastructure because it occurs in areas of the country where no
production had taken place in the past (e.g. Pennsylvania).' 21 The U.S. Congress
has recently passed the Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act with the aim
to expedite the federal approval for interstate natural gas pipelines. 122 However,
the long-term paybacks of such investments combined with the fact that it may not
always be economical to construct such pipelines 123 may still prevent the additional
production from being adequately transported and consumed in the domestic
territory, leading to areas of local oversupply and thus lower prices and areas of
higher prices.124 Moreover, long-term investments and planning would also be
needed in the United States to accelerate structural changes in sectors, such as
transportation or electricity, which have not traditionally relied on natural gas in
the United States. 125 In principle, exports could thus provide an alternative avenue
for U.S. natural gas, which will help to avoid domestic oversupply and low prices
and will stimulate shale gas production benefitting from higher prices in the
international market.
119. Id. Although there are projects to expand existing mideontinent refineries and also build new
ones, the envisaged additional refining capacity would still remain largely insufficient to cover the
expansion of light oil production in that area of the country.
120. See id.
121. TIM BOERSMA & CHARLES K. EBINGER, NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT No. 3:
DEBATES RELATED TO NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE: INVESTMENTS AND EMISSIONS 3 (2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2014/natural-gas-infrastructure-investments-
emissions/debates-natural-gas-infrastructure-investments-emissions-boersma-ebinger.pdf.
122. Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act, H.R. 1900, 113th Cong. (2013).
123. This is the case, for instance, of New England. Based on the configuration of existing natural
gas pipelines, New England is not well-served, leading to higher prices of natural gas in that part of the
country. However, the problem of higher prices may not likely be solved through the construction of
new pipelines because it mainly relates to winter times, when demand for natural gas peaks.
Companies may therefore not be keen to construct a pipeline just for facilitating this period of peak
demand. NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENTNO. 3, supra note 121 at 3.
124. Another important issue is whether, in case exports of natural gas from the United States
continue to be restricted, domestic shale gas prices in areas of surged production would allow for the
full recovery of costs and a reasonable profit. THOMAS L. BREWER, THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2, 7, 15, 21 (2014),
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2014/03/the-shale-gas-revolution-implications-for-sustainable-
development-and-intemational-trade.pdf.
125. Id. at 4-6.
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However, the exportation of LNG to Europe would also require additional
investments on the part of both the United States and the European Union in export
and import LGN terminals respectively (i.e. additional U.S. liquefaction terminals
and additional E.U. regasification terminals). Investing in such facilities could
represent a means for the European Union to strengthen its bargaining position
with the Russian Federation in view of renegotiating existing contracts and
lowering prices. 12 6 Realistically, building the missing regasification facilities in
Europe for the purpose of intensifying E.U.-U.S. LNG flows would require some
three to five years. It could thus potentially not be of use for solving the energy
security problem in the short-term. Moreover, the uncertainties surrounding the
medium to long-term productivity of shale rock formations may disincentivize
companies to invest in such an operation, as it would require massive capital
injections against long-term payback revenues. 127
C. Political Economy Interests
The discussions concerning the possible removal of the U.S. export barriers
on crude oil and natural gas has fuelled the domestic debate over the potential
winners and losers in the United States and around the world-especially in the
European Union. In the United States, the immediate beneficiaries of the crude oil
ban and the stringent licensing regime imposed on natural gas exports have been
the downstream processing producers, which have enjoyed abundant energy supply
at a relatively cheap price. The U.S. energy "renaissance" triggered by the shale
revolution has, however, led to a boom in domestic production, which in turn
translated into a wide disconnect between international and domestic crude prices
due to the export restrictions in place.' 28 The question is now whether allowing
U.S. exports into (at least) the E.U. market could bring benefits, in terms of
production and economic growth, capable of outweighing the negative impacts
expected to affect some economic players.
In the case of oil, analysts seem to agree that the export ban has so far brought
advantages to midcontinent refineries, which have benefited from local oversupply
of tight oil. The price of refined petroleum products such as gasoline, however,
has not decreased for consumers as a result of the export restrictions in place. 129
Moreover, it is generally considered that the current export restrictions, by
126. See JASON BORDOFF &TREVOR HOUSER, AMERICAN GAS TO THE RESCUE? THE IMPACT OF
US LNG EXPORTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 3 (2014),
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/CGEP-Ameican%2Gas%20to%20the%20
Rescue%3F.pdf.
127. NATURAL GAS BRIEFING DOCUMENT NO. 3, supra note 121 at 2-3.
128. This effect was also amplified by the infrastructural gaps experienced by the U.S. oil and gas
industry after the explosion of shale oil and gas production. See Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. See
supra Section V(B).
129. Houser & Mohan, supra note 1. Yet, the gasoline prices have fallen sharply in the last few
months in the United States, following the collapse of oil prices in the international market. Henning
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preventing a realigning of domestic U.S. oil prices and global oil prices, would
ultimately dampen U.S. shale oil production.130  By contrast, macroeconomic
analyses and projections show that allowing U.S. exports of crude oil would be
beneficial for the U.S. economy as a whole, as it would incentivize crude
production, increase new investments in the expansion of U.S. energy
infrastructure, and boost income, domestic employment and taxes along the
production chain. 31 Furthermore, while the domestic prices are expected to rise
only to a limited extent,' 32 gasoline prices are projected to decrease following the
lifting of the ban due to the effects of an expansion of global crude supply to the
benefit of both American and European consumers.'
33
Similarly, in the case of natural gas, opponents to the removal of export
restrictions are mostly a nucleus of dominant industrial consumers of natural gas
(e.g. Dow Chemical and the Industrial Energy Consumers of America, who fear to
lose the competitive advantage arising from the provision of low-cost supply of
natural gas). 134 However, not only the increase in natural gas prices domestically
is projected to be marginal and inconsequential on domestic manufacturing,'3 5 but
also the effects associated with the removal of export barriers on U.S. natural gas
are generally considered to be beneficial when assessed from a macroeconomic
perspective, due to the positive impacts of increased domestic gas production on
infrastructure investments (e.g. liquefaction plants, pipelines, etc.) and domestic
employment. 136 Ultimately, the case for lifting U.S. export barriers on crude oil
and gas will very much depend on how well organized the winners and losers
fronts would be.
D. Environmental Concerns
The energy-related initiatives of the European Union, especially those
regarding export restrictions, provoked strong criticism on the part of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and green parties on both sides of the
Atlantic. In a critical report, Earthjustice highlighted the dangers of the E.U.
proposal on energy, arguing that it would expand fossil fuel exploration, while
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restricting investment in renewable energy. 137 The NGO is particularly concerned
about a likely increase in the U.S. production of shale gas and oil, which is
associated with environmental risks because of the use of hydraulic fracturing. 138
A growing sense of unease is also being felt with respect to the proposed
competition rules in the energy sector. 139 The fear is that competition rules for
energy trade might hamper the promotion of renewable energy in the European
Union, as such rules could impose constraints on national policies supporting
renewable energy producers. 140 Moreover, applying the principle of "freedom of
transit" to energy transport via pipelines and transmission grids may limit the
ability to regulate the environment and prevent climate change. 141
Although concerns regarding the threats to the promotion of renewable energy
may be warranted and need thorough examination, the advantages of natural gas
over coal for the abatement of emissions, particularly in the short and medium
term, should also be considered. It needs to be examined to what extent the U.S.
imports of natural gas into the European Union may replace the consumption of
coal, which, if combusted without carbon capture and storage facilities, is more
carbon-intensive than gas, even if the latter is delivered to consumers in a liquefied
form. 142 At the same time, it should also be examined to what extent the declining
consumption of coal in the United States, and thus the reduction of domestic
carbon emissions would be offset by carbon emissions derived from increasing
consumption of coal imported from the United States abroad. 143 The situation
however can be different if the United States becomes a leading exporter of natural
gas too. While the U.S. shale revolution has so far led to increased coal imports
into the European Union, replacing the import of coal by natural gas from the
United States could lead to the reduction in the E.U. levels of carbon emissions.144
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
TTIP negotiations present an opportunity to negotiate a legal framework for
bilateral trade in energy, which could serve as a model for future negotiations at a
multilateral level. A key interest of the European Union in the energy negotiations
with the United States is the removal of U.S. export barriers for crude oil and
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natural gas, which would enable it to diversify its energy sources in light of the
uncertainties surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While the European Union
is evidently a demandeur in this respect, the liberalisation of the U.S. energy
export regime and the increase in external trade in shale oil and gas would
generally be beneficial also for the United States when assessed from a
macroeconomic perspective.
Yet, the conclusion of a shale deal between the European Union and the
United States will ultimately depend on the interplay of different factors, including
geopolitics and oil price dynamics, existing infrastructural deficiencies, political
economy interests and environmental concerns. The recent geopolitical
developments in Eastern Europe seem to be conducive to the opening of U.S. shale
supplies to Europe. Uncertainties however exist as to the medium- and long-term
behaviour of oil prices. Furthermore, the lifting of export restrictions could in
principle mitigate the imbalances produced in the U.S. domestic oil and gas
markets due to inadequacy of existing U.S. infrastructure. In particular, allowing
U.S. exports would correct the mismatch between domestic prices and world prices
to the benefit of U.S. producers, while at the same time making consumers in the
United States and around the world better off due to the expected decrease in
global oil prices. The intensification of E.U.-U.S. trade will, however, require
considerable investment in infrastructure on both sides. Moreover, a shale deal
between the European Union and the United States will need to take into account
environmental concerns over fracking technologies and possible negative effects
on carbon emissions.
Finally, independently from the outcomes of E.U.-U.S. specific negotiations
on energy, the conclusion of TTIP would itself represent a first step towards the
liberalisation of the U.S. energy export regime. The European Union will benefit
from its status of FTA partner enabling U.S. producers to export natural gas
through the automatic granting of an export licence. More liberalized trade under
the TTIP in general would likely pave the way for relaxing the U.S. energy export
restrictions in the future.
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